Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Consent: Consent is the voluntary approval or permission given by an individual, acknowledging and agreeing to a specific action, idea, or request. See also Agreement, Consensus, Conflicts._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Constitutional Economics on Consent - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 205 Consent/information/ignorance/Constitutional economics/Voigt: The possibility of hypothetical consent crucially depends on the information assumptions. a) Buchanan and Tullock (1962(1), p. 78) introduced the veil of uncertainty in which the individual cannot make any long-term predictions on her or his future socio-economic position. b) John Rawls' (1971)(2) veil of ignorance is more radical because the consenting individuals are asked to decide on proposed rules as if they did not have any knowledge of their individual fate. Rawls' veil is thus more demanding of the individuals. Both veils assume a rather curious asymmetry concerning certain kinds of knowledge: on the one hand, the citizens are supposed to know very little about their own socio-economic position, but on the other, they are supposed to have at their disposal a consistent theory concerning the working properties of alternative constitutional rules. In a paper on "veilonomics," Voigt (2015)(3) compares the two veils and points out that Rawls' veil serves to derive substantial principles, whereas Buchanan's veil serves a procedural purpose, namely to improve the chance that societies reach unanimity in their constitutional choice. >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics, >Direct Democracy/Constitutional economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962). The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 2. Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap. 3. Voigt, S. (2015). "Veilonomics: On the Use and Utility of Veils in Constitutional Political Economy," in: Louis M. Imbeau & Steve Jacob (eds). Behind a Veil of Ignorance? Power and Uncertainty in Constitutional Design. Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 9-33. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Constitutional Economics Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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> Counter arguments against Constitutional Economics
> Counter arguments in relation to Consent
